



# AUTOMOTIVE

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# SAFETY-CRITICAL SYSTEMS

- **Failure or malfunction** may result in
  - Death or serious injury to people
  - Loss or severe damage to equipment/property
  - Environmental harm
- **Exhaustive Verification and Validation** (V&V) process to guarantee the safety goals are met
- Each domain has its own guidelines and regulations for SW and HW

**DO178C**



**ISO26262**



**EN50126/8**




# AUTOMOTIVE DOMAIN

- High-performance needed but... within specific domain requirements
  - **Reliability**
    - Harsh operating conditions due to Electro-Magnetic Interference (EMI), humidity, vibration, etc.
  - **Safety**
    - Development process subject to **functional safety standards**
      - Design
      - Verification and validation
  - **Security**
    - Connectivity
    - Updates

# AUTOMOTIVE COMPLIANT MCU


- Specifically designed to meet automotive requirements for any safety integrity level
  - E.g. Infineon AURIX processor family
- But **insufficient performance** for some ADAS and AD applications
  - ADAS: Advanced Driver Assistance System
  - AD: Autonomous Driving
- **GPP can deliver performance needed**
  - ... but must also meet automotive requirements

# THE EPI APPROACH: EMBEDDED HPC ARCHITECTURE



# SAFETY LIFECYCLE (ISO26262)

- Safety lifecycle intended for items designed to offer **appropriate safety measures**
  - Observability, controllability, diverse redundancy, watchdogs, etc
- GPP is, by nature, **against some of these requirements**
  - Target: average case, not worst case
  - Few safety measures
- **Fitting automotive safety lifecycles is a complex challenge**




# AUTOMOTIVE SAFETY REGULATIONS: ISO26262 AND SOTIF

- Functionalities are classified in different **Automotive Safety Integrity Levels (ASIL)** based on:
  - Severity
  - Exposure
  - Controllability upon failure
- Higher levels implies stricter design and V&V process
  - Increase costs
  - More difficult to achieve



# REQUIREMENTS FOR ADAS


- An **ADAS unavailable system is a safe system**
  - No fault tolerance needed
  - Just detect faults and reach a safe state timely
- ASIL-D MCU monitoring QM GPP
  - **No safety requirements for GPP**






# REQUIREMENTS FOR AD

- An **AD system must remain always available**
  - **Fault tolerance needed** (no safe state!!)
  - Detect and recover from faults timely
- GPP must also reach ASIL-D (potentially with some help of the MCU)




# AUTOMOTIVE EPI ARCHITECTURE DETAILS




# AUTOMOTIVE EPI ARCHITECTURE DETAILS

- Preferably a **single GPP**
  - As for automotive MCUs due to efficiency, reliability,...
- I/O managed by the MCU
  - As in today's systems
- Performance-demanding functionalities **offloaded onto the GPP**
  - Build upon interfaces compliant with auto reliability requirements
- **MCU monitors** execution in the GPP
  - No safety or security violations
  - E.g. no resource flooding, no resource overutilization



# AUTOMOTIVE EPI SOFTWARE STACK

- Build upon **AUTOSAR** (AUTomotive Open System ARchitecture)
  - Standardized SW architecture
  - Defines interfaces, architecture of apps (SW components, runnables, tasks), diagnosis mechanisms
- MCU with classic AUTOSAR
  - **Well established practice**
  - Legacy SW, any app with sufficient performance in the MCU
- GPP with Adaptive AUTOSAR
  - **Scale up to the challenge** of complex platforms
  - High-performance CPU
  - Advanced communication with environment
  - Etc



# CHALLENGES AHEAD

- **Meet automotive requirements** preserving performance
  - A single design meeting the requirements of HPC and automotive markets
- **Reliability** in harsh environments
  - Only reliable components implemented with reliable technology processes
- Sufficient degree of **observability and controllability**
  - MCU monitors GPP, and must detect faults quickly
  - MCU must have means to take corrective actions on the GPP to preserve fault tolerance
- Deliver **performance** needed for AD with fault tolerance
  - No safe state
  - HW design must meet not yet fully understood requirements of complex and changing SW systems



# QUESTIONS?